Hunting Tigers or Swatting Flies? The Impact of Anti-corruption Information in China

Abstract Since 2012, China has steadily advanced its anti-corruption efforts through the dual strategies of “hunting tigers” and “swatting flies.” However, the distinct impact of information about these two approaches on public perceptions of corruption across government levels remains underexplored. Drawing on a randomized survey experiment with 1,596 respondents in H province, this study reveals a phenomenon we term “hierarchical corruption perception.” Our findings indicate that information about grassroots-focused “swatting flies” efforts significantly reduces public perceptions of corruption at lower levels of government while producing mixed effects for perceived corruption at higher levels. In contrast, information about high-profile “hunting tigers” cases has limited average effects but significantly impacts individuals with lower corruption tolerance. By demonstrating that the effects of anti-corruption information depend on both the level of government involved and individual predispositions, these findings challenge conventional views on “corruption scandal fatigue” and provide important insights for designing effective, grassroots-oriented anti-corruption communication strategies.