Reselling/Agency Selling and Online Intermediaries’ Information Sharing With Manufacturers and Resellers

中介的 业务 代理(哲学) 营销 信息共享 商业 广告 产业组织 微观经济学 经济 计算机科学 认识论 万维网 哲学
作者
Xiaogang Lin,Qiang Lin,Ying‐Ju Chen
出处
期刊:Production and Operations Management [Wiley]
卷期号:33 (1): 264-281 被引量:30
标识
DOI:10.1177/10591478231224934
摘要

Manufacturers and their resellers generally employ online intermediaries to sell their products. These intermediaries often possess superior demand information and decide whether to share it with their sellers. In practice, the manufacturers can employ two possible selling formats: reselling ([Formula: see text]), under which they sell the products to the intermediaries who subsequently resell to customers and agency selling ([Formula: see text]), under which they sell the products to customers through the intermediaries by paying a proportional fee. Additionally, the manufacturers can also sell the products to their resellers who subsequently resell to customers through the intermediaries. We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate an e-commerce supply chain in which an online intermediary first decides whether to disclose information option to a manufacturer and/or reseller; thereafter, the manufacturer selects between the [Formula: see text] or [Formula: see text] format. Regardless of the information-sharing decision made by the intermediary, the manufacturer’s selling format selection remains qualitatively unchanged. However, the intermediary can compel the manufacturer to change his selling format by sharing information with only the manufacturer or reseller in certain market environments. When the intensity is small but the proportional fee is intermediate, the intermediary should share information with only the manufacturer to compel him to change his selling format choice from [Formula: see text] to [Formula: see text]. When both the intensity and fee are intermediate, the intermediary should share information exclusively with the manufacturer (or reseller) to prompt a change in the manufacturer’s selling format, switching from [Formula: see text] to [Formula: see text] (or from [Formula: see text] to [Formula: see text]), contingent upon whether the magnitude of demand fluctuation is small or large.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
更新
PDF的下载单位、IP信息已删除 (2025-6-4)

科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
1l完成签到,获得积分10
1秒前
直率的饼干完成签到,获得积分10
1秒前
开放剑鬼完成签到,获得积分10
1秒前
阿泡阿茶和阿壶完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
ccmxigua完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
5秒前
易止完成签到 ,获得积分10
5秒前
Sofia完成签到,获得积分10
8秒前
xixihaha完成签到,获得积分10
8秒前
吴家豪完成签到,获得积分10
9秒前
11秒前
推土机爱学习完成签到 ,获得积分10
14秒前
推土机爱学习完成签到 ,获得积分10
14秒前
天真酒窝完成签到,获得积分10
15秒前
阳佟念真完成签到,获得积分0
16秒前
orixero应助彭伟盼采纳,获得10
17秒前
韩星发布了新的文献求助10
17秒前
cllg完成签到,获得积分10
18秒前
虚心的冷雪完成签到,获得积分10
18秒前
21秒前
hff完成签到 ,获得积分10
24秒前
25秒前
Aintzane完成签到 ,获得积分10
25秒前
sun完成签到 ,获得积分10
28秒前
jackhlj完成签到,获得积分10
30秒前
彭伟盼发布了新的文献求助10
31秒前
kiyo_v完成签到,获得积分10
33秒前
ran完成签到 ,获得积分10
33秒前
34秒前
yeape完成签到,获得积分10
34秒前
天玄完成签到 ,获得积分10
35秒前
john完成签到,获得积分10
36秒前
轻松的冰淇淋完成签到,获得积分10
38秒前
zdnn完成签到,获得积分10
38秒前
彭伟盼完成签到,获得积分10
39秒前
40秒前
爱玛爱玛完成签到 ,获得积分10
40秒前
Polaris完成签到,获得积分10
41秒前
43秒前
幽默发卡完成签到,获得积分10
43秒前
高分求助中
(应助此贴封号)【重要!!请各用户(尤其是新用户)详细阅读】【科研通的精品贴汇总】 10000
Rapid Review of Electrodiagnostic and Neuromuscular Medicine: A Must-Have Reference for Neurologists and Physiatrists 1000
An overview of orchard cover crop management 800
基于3um sOl硅光平台的集成发射芯片关键器件研究 500
National standards & grade-level outcomes for K-12 physical education 400
Research Handbook on Law and Political Economy Second Edition 400
Decoding Teacher Well-being in Rural China 300
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 医学 生物 材料科学 工程类 有机化学 内科学 生物化学 物理 计算机科学 纳米技术 遗传学 基因 复合材料 化学工程 物理化学 病理 催化作用 免疫学 量子力学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 4807219
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 4122120
关于积分的说明 12753279
捐赠科研通 3856850
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 2123440
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 1145522
关于科研通互助平台的介绍 1038074