贝叶斯博弈
计算机科学
入侵检测系统
无线自组网
博弈论
贝叶斯概率
移动自组网
对手
节点(物理)
纳什均衡
序贯博弈
无线
计算机网络
分布式计算
计算机安全
人工智能
网络数据包
工程类
数学优化
数理经济学
电信
结构工程
数学
作者
Yu Liu,Cristina Comaniciu,Hong Man
标识
DOI:10.1145/1190195.1190198
摘要
In wireless ad hoc networks, although defense strategies such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can be deployed at each mobile node, significant constraints are imposed in terms of the energy expenditure of such systems. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework to analyze the interactions between pairs of attacking/defending nodes using a Bayesian formulation. We study the achievable Nash equilibrium for the attacker/defender game in both static and dynamic scenarios. The dynamic Bayesian game is a more realistic model, since it allows the defender to consistently update his belief on his opponent's maliciousness as the game evolves. A new Bayesian hybrid detection approach is suggested for the defender, in which a lightweight monitoring system is used to estimate his opponent's actions, and a heavyweight monitoring system acts as a last resort of defense. We show that the dynamic game produces energy-efficient monitoring strategies for the defender, while improving the overall hybrid detection power.
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