锦标赛
激励
债务
成熟度(心理)
货币经济学
业务
债权人
审查
情感(语言学)
经济
财务
微观经济学
心理学
发展心理学
语言学
哲学
数学
组合数学
政治学
法学
作者
Wanxia Qi,Pornsit Jiraporn,Yixin Liu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102081
摘要
Our study investigates the effect of external industry tournament incentives on debt maturity structure. Prior research shows that industry tournament incentives motivate managers to employ more risky strategies. Recognizing this stronger tendency for risk-taking, creditors may shorten debt maturity and subject managers to more frequent scrutiny by debt markets. Consistent with this notion, our results show that stronger industry tournament incentives lead to significantly more short-term debt. This effect is more pronounced in firms with low credit quality, in areas with a high density of firms from the same industry, and in industries with more CEO positions.
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