政府(语言学)
惩罚(心理学)
黑客
执行
计算机科学
执法
计算机安全
顺从(心理学)
互联网隐私
隐私保护
信息隐私
协同模型
作弊
业务
生成语法
知识管理
博弈论
严肃的游戏
1998年数据保护法
个人可识别信息
许可
生成模型
隐私政策
信息保护政策
提升(金属加工)
设计隐私
协作学习
信息安全
情报分析
作者
Liurong Zhao,Wenjing Wei,Leting Cao
标识
DOI:10.1093/comjnl/bxag043
摘要
Abstract The rapid development and application popularization of generative artificial intelligence (GAI) technology have led to privacy protection challenges, which have aroused widespread concern. It is of great significance to explore the collaborative supervision mechanisms for privacy protection in GAI and to improve the efficiency of supervision. Under the collaborative supervision mechanisms of government administrative supervision and enterprise self-regulation, an evolutionary game model consisting of GAI enterprises, users, and hackers is constructed, which is combined with the simulation method to examine the influence of different factors on privacy protection in GAI and its supervision. The results indicate that there are four stable equilibrium strategies in the collaborative supervision game system. For enterprises, the government’s reward and punishment measures as well as the users’ trust in enterprises assist them in raising the awareness of responsible innovation. Especially when the cost of compliance is high and enforcement is constrained, rewards are likely to be more effective than increasing punishments in encouraging enterprises to implement responsible innovation. For users, their sensitive information disclosure can be reduced by increasing their sense of privacy protection through education and publicity. For hackers, the efficiency of privacy supervision can be enhanced with higher punishments for illegal activities.
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