货币政策
经济
货币经济学
信贷渠道
量化宽松
磁隔离
中国金融体系
磁隔离
金融体系
银行信贷
中国
通货膨胀目标
政府(语言学)
货币霸权
货币改革
巴塞尔协议III
银行监管
官方现金利率
准备金率
前向制导
信用记录
资本重组
货币主义
公开市场操作
业务
资本要求
信用风险
作者
Xiaoming Li,Zheng Liu,Yuchao Peng,Zhiwei Xu
摘要
Using confidential loan-level data, we examine how Basel III influenced the responses of bank risk-taking to monetary policy shocks in China. We use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, exploiting disparities in lending behavior between high- and low-risk bank branches before and after the new regulations. Our findings reveal a novel risk-weighting channel through which monetary policy easing significantly reduced bank risk-taking. However, this risk reduction was achieved by shifting lending towards ostensibly low-risk state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with government guarantees, despite their lower average productivity. Our findings suggest a trade-off facing China’s monetary policy between curbing bank risks and addressing credit misallocation. (JEL E52, G21, G28, L32, O16, P24, P34)
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