激励
集合(抽象数据类型)
计算机科学
基线(sea)
微观经济学
重复博弈
可信赖性
经济
网络结构
博弈论
数理经济学
编队网络
基础(拓扑)
群(周期表)
激励相容性
网络模型
均衡选择
钥匙(锁)
出处
期刊:B E Journal of Theoretical Economics
[De Gruyter]
日期:2026-04-07
标识
DOI:10.1515/bejte-2025-0099
摘要
Abstract This paper proposes a model of evolution of networks of cooperation where networks form and evolve through repeated pair-wise interactions between players in a finite population. While the baseline incentive structure of these interactions is that of a coordination game, these incentives are transformed by additional network effects based on the assumption that the benefit to any player from a mutually cooperative relationship is enhanced, over its base value, by a factor of their trustworthiness as perceived by the interacting partner, through network-based channels. In the presence of a set of altruists, the evolution of networks of cooperation is analyzed through repeated interactions between myopically best-responding players who have varied costs of cooperation.
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