Disclosure to Regulate Learning in Product Markets from the Stock Market

ABSTRACT A firm's stock price may reveal information to a variety of participants, including its strategic partners and competitive rivals. This paper establishes that when a firm discloses cost information it can confound decision-relevant demand information embedded in the stock price that observers can otherwise extract. With stock price valuing firm profit (not cost and revenue separately), a disconnect is introduced between the firm's actions and its intent—it discloses more (less) on one dimension when its intent is to conceal (reveal) on another. Moreover, the firm's intent can be to either reveal or conceal information depending on what gives its partner the best competitive edge over its rival. Consequently, a firm's disclosure is made strategically, incorporating both valuation and competitive effects. Interestingly, the firm's disclosure strategy is designed in close concert with its production decision, i.e., the firm's optimal accounting and real decisions interact with each other for maximum impact.