Exploration on Income Distribution and Incentive Mechanism in Venture Investment——Based on the Analysis of Principal-agent Model under Information Asymmetry

The venture investors and venture capitalists in the venture investment market will form a principal-agent relationship under information asymmetry,which will further cause adverse selection and moral hazard.In order to reduce information asymmetry as well as conflict of interests between the principals and agents,the author establishes a set of models to analyze the mechanism for income distribution between venture investors and venture capitalists.According to the analysis through the models,the author finds out the best way for income distribution,advances more optimized measures to prevent risks in a principal-agent relationship as well as the incentive mechanism so as to solve a series of problems such as the adverse selection and moral hazard due to the information asymmetry which are hard to resolve for the venture investors and also to help venture investors maximize their own interests by regulating venture capitalists' activities so that the venture investment market becomes more prosperous and develops more healthily.