How does channel network coopetition behaviors affect transaction specific investment? The moderating roles of contract type and dependence asymmetry

Empirical studies on network channel members' behavior are lacking in industrial marketing research. Three groups of experiments were conducted on 341 managers, who have expertise and experience in marketing channel management, to determine the effects of coopetition behavior on transaction-specific investment (TSI) from the perspective of channel network and to analyze the moderating effects of contract type and dependency asymmetry. The results reveal that when other distributors in the channel network choose to cooperate with suppliers (vs. compete), a distributor's willingness to make a TSI is higher. With a prevention-framed contract, the cooperation (vs. competition) behavior of other distributors in the channel network can increase a distributor's TSI, and these effects will be weakened under promotion-framed contract. Dependence asymmetry partially moderates the impact of coopetition behavior on TSI. In the case of distributor dependence advantage, a distributor's willingness to invest in TSI will be higher when other distributors' competition (vs. cooperation) behavior is dominant in the channel network. In the case of distributor dependence disadvantage, the moderating effects of dependence asymmetry are not significant. This study provides theoretical and practical contributions to network relationship governance in industrial marketing.