Smart Navigation Via Strategic Communications in a Mixed Autonomous Paradigm

Motivated by the emerging mixed autonomous paradigm in cobotic order picking operations, we investigate the optimal information design to navigate human workers (HWs) who cooperate with autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) within an intralogistics system. We incorporate asymmetric information between AMRs and HWs in a routing game where connected AMRs are informed of the congestion state while HWs rely on information provided by the system. The system designs a communication policy aiming to navigate HWs away from congestion. Without strategic communications, we show that the deployment of AMRs cannot mitigate congestion unless the automation level reaches a threshold. Interestingly, we illustrate a substitution effect between automation and strategic communications when information distortion is mild. In contrast, severe information distortion complements automation due to exacerbated congestion. Furthermore, an in‐house AMR fleet is economically more efficient than a third‐party logistics service. Consequently, in‐house automation can be achieved with mild information distortion, while severe information distortion is required to complement the lack of efficiency in the third‐party AMR fleet. With simulated numerical examples to complement the analytical results, we provide managerial insights concerning the optimal information policies under different levels of automation, guiding warehouse managers in their communications with workers to achieve the best performance of the cobotic system.