套利
透明度(行为)
国际商务
跨国公司
附属的
银行监管
外部性
业务
经济
金融体系
会计
国际经济学
财务
管理
法学
微观经济学
政治学
作者
Tai-Yuan Chen,Yi‐Chun Chen,Mingyi Hung
标识
DOI:10.1057/s41267-021-00491-6
摘要
Motivated by international business research on institutional arbitrage and headquarters–subsidiary relationships, we examine the effect of regulatory distance on multinational banks’ (MNBs) reporting transparency abroad. Using an international sample of foreign subsidiary banks in 46 host countries from 47 home countries, we find that bank transparency declines when the home countries have tighter activity restrictions than the host countries. We bolster the causal inference using difference-in-differences designs that take advantage of banking reforms and cross-border bank acquisitions. We also find that the result is more pronounced when parent banks have lower capital ratios or when host countries have weaker supervisory power, suggesting that parent banks use opaque reporting to conceal risk-taking abroad. Further analysis finds that less transparent subsidiaries are more likely to fail during financial crises. Overall, our findings suggest that regulatory distance creates negative externalities for bank transparency and stability abroad.
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