风险分析(工程)
脆弱性(计算)
贝叶斯网络
信息物理系统
工艺安全
相互依存
计算机安全
过程(计算)
风险评估
故障树分析
概率逻辑
脆弱性评估
计算机科学
概率风险评估
工程类
领结
系统安全
可靠性工程
在制品
业务
运营管理
操作系统
电信
心理学
天线(收音机)
人工智能
心理治疗师
心理弹性
法学
政治学
作者
Shuaiqi Yuan,Ming Yang,Genserik Reniers
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.compind.2023.104056
摘要
<p>Aligned with the development needs of Industry 4.0, industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs) are widely applied to chemical facilities to facilitate so-called intelligent production processes. Meanwhile, emerging cyber-to-physical (C2P) risks are introduced due to the vulnerability of ICPSs to cyberattacks. An integrated safety and security risk assessment of chemical facilities equipped with industrial cyber-physical systems becomes challenging, particularly in performing a probabilistic/quantitative risk assessment. Targeting this gap, this study develops a systematic approach to construct accident scenarios concerning both safety hazards and security threats and performs a probabilistic risk assessment of chemical facilities considering the interdependency between safety-associated events and security-associated events. In the proposed approach, bow-tie technique is used to perform a safety risk analysis, and meanwhile, the possible dangerous scenarios caused by physical attacks and C2P attacks are also identified and integrated into the bow-tie diagram. Particularly, attack impact modeling of C2P attacks helps to identify dangerous attack modes, and a time-to-compromise (TTC) based method is used to quantify the vulnerability of ICPSs to C2P attacks. Then, a Bayesian network (BN) model is developed to perform an integrated safety and security risk analysis. An illustrative case study is used in this study to give guidance on performing integrated safety and security risk assessment of ICPSs and validate the feasibility of the proposed approach.</p>
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