透明度(行为)
业务
供应链
农业
环境经济学
产业组织
冷链
可追溯性
商业
供应链管理
承包经营
链条(单位)
农业科学
食物供应
农业经济学
仓库
作者
Qingkai Ji,Guangmei Lyu,Guoqing Zhang
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2026.2762320
摘要
In modern fresh agricultural supply chains, information asymmetry and freshness uncertainty are major sources of inefficiency. Under traditional supply chains, retailers often lack accurate and verifiable information on product freshness, which makes it difficult for all participating parties to align their operational objectives and also exacerbates transaction frictions. To address these issues, we develop a game-theoretic model involving a supplier, a third-party logistics provider (TPLP), and a retailer, where product freshness is determined by the TPLP’s effort and verified through blockchain-based monitoring. A freshness-threshold smart contract is designed to govern ordering and compensation decisions. We derive equilibrium outcomes under both traditional and smart contract scenarios. The results show that smart contracts fundamentally change the TPLP’s effort incentives. In the traditional scenario, transportation and freshness-keeping costs act as information rents for unobservable effort that incentivises the effort, whereas under smart contracts, effort is mainly driven by the unit blockchain transaction cost. We further show that an appropriate compensation parameter can achieve supply chain coordination and Pareto improvement. Finally, extending the model to a food bank scenario shows that donating low-freshness but edible products reduces inefficiency and food waste while generating economic and social benefits.
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