Financing strategy options based on blockchain technology in supply chains with insufficient guarantee capacity

Purpose This study aims to examine how blockchain technology affects the financing and operational decisions of firms in supply chains with insufficient guarantee capacity. Design/methodology/approach To improve the competitiveness of the whole supply chain, the manufacturer with insufficient guarantee capacity can implement financial assistance by providing two financing strategies: non-blockchain guarantee financing (NGF) and blockchain guarantee financing (BGF). The options for each strategy remain unclear and require further research. Based on this, we adopt the Stackelberg game to describe the interactions among the supply chain participants. We derive the equilibrium decisions for each participant and compare the advantages of different financing strategies. Findings The results indicate that the critical point that allows the optimal order quantities to be equal under both financing modes decreases as the guarantee fee rate increases. Then, the manufacturer’s coguarantee share is negatively related to the guarantee fee rate. Regarding the financial performance of supply chain participants under both strategies, the retailer is more favorable in BGF than in NGF when the actual coefficient is low, and the manufacturer’s profit hinges on the balance of underlying losses against wholesale price revenues. In addition, we identify win-win areas for supply chain participants, where both adopt blockchain technology with lower actual coefficients or guarantee fee rates. Originality/value The blockchain technology enables the guarantee company to engage directly in the supply chain, providing a coguarantee with the manufacturer for the capital-constrained retailer, thereby enhancing the supply chain’s guarantee capacity.