Trade Credit with Costly Sales Revenue Verification

业务 利润(经济学) 供应链 收入 贷款 贸易信贷 财务 微观经济学 利润率 透明度(行为) 供应链管理 销售管理 产业组织 商业 经济
作者
Paola Martin,Diwakar Gupta
出处
期刊:Manufacturing & Service Operations Management [Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
卷期号:28 (3): 860-876
标识
DOI:10.1287/msom.2023.0443
摘要

Problem definition: Trade credit is a common mechanism for financing retail inventories. A supplier who offers trade credit may not observe sales revenue and verification is costly. When a retailer offers to pay less than the full loan amount, the supplier may either accept the offered amount or initiate verification. We investigate the impact of costly sales revenue verification on the equilibrium wholesale price and loan limit, with the goal of determining whether the supplier’s profit is greater when verification is cost-free as opposed to when it is costly. Methodology/results: We formulate and analyze the interaction between a supplier, who is the shot caller, and a retailer within the confines of a wholesale-price net-terms contract via a game theoretic model and derive their in-equilibrium actions. Our key finding is that the presence of positive verification costs can increase the supplier’s expected profit compared with the setting where verification costs are zero. We show that this happens when the retailer’s assets and the verification costs are sufficiently high, but not too high. There exist parameters for which the retailer’s terminal wealth and the supply chain profit are also higher under positive verification costs. Managerial implications: Our paper provides assurance to suppliers that they need not be concerned about sales transparency when the retailer’s assets and the verification costs are in the midrange. Moreover, it shows how suppliers can utilize the levers of loan limit and wholesale price to extract most of the supply chain profit gains from positive verification costs. Our results are relevant in settings where suppliers have pricing power and dictate the contract terms. Funding: This work was supported by the Division of Civil, Mechanical and Manufacturing Innovation of the National Science Foundation of the United States [Grant 1755254]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0443 .
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
1秒前
Cola完成签到,获得积分0
1秒前
小怨种完成签到,获得积分10
1秒前
han发布了新的文献求助10
1秒前
tb168tb完成签到,获得积分10
2秒前
新晋老板完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
dui完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
密码学博士完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
科研通AI2S应助坦率紫菜采纳,获得10
4秒前
nono完成签到 ,获得积分10
5秒前
李陈发布了新的文献求助10
6秒前
环游世界完成签到 ,获得积分10
7秒前
香蕉觅云应助123采纳,获得10
7秒前
9秒前
10秒前
10秒前
11秒前
LSW发布了新的文献求助20
12秒前
12秒前
12秒前
maizhan完成签到,获得积分10
13秒前
小雨应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
14秒前
Owen应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
14秒前
14秒前
酷波er应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
14秒前
所所应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
14秒前
烟花应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
14秒前
CipherSage应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
14秒前
汉堡包应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
14秒前
123完成签到,获得积分10
14秒前
科研通AI2S应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
14秒前
orixero应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
15秒前
科研通AI2S应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
15秒前
SciGPT应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
15秒前
15秒前
Orange应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
15秒前
无极微光应助科研通管家采纳,获得20
15秒前
852应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
15秒前
酷波er应助科研通管家采纳,获得10
15秒前
15秒前
高分求助中
Psychopathic Traits and Quality of Prison Life 1000
Chemistry and Physics of Carbon Volume 18 800
The formation of Australian attitudes towards China, 1918-1941 660
Signals, Systems, and Signal Processing 610
天津市智库成果选编 600
Forced degradation and stability indicating LC method for Letrozole: A stress testing guide 500
全相对论原子结构与含时波包动力学的理论研究--清华大学 500
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 医学 生物 纳米技术 工程类 有机化学 化学工程 生物化学 计算机科学 物理 内科学 复合材料 催化作用 物理化学 光电子学 电极 细胞生物学 基因 无机化学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 6451411
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 8263349
关于积分的说明 17607545
捐赠科研通 5516195
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 2903669
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 1880634
关于科研通互助平台的介绍 1722651