解雇
成文法
业务
补偿(心理学)
职工薪酬
工作场所安全
公共政策
职业安全与健康
公共经济学
经济
法学
政治学
经济增长
心理学
精神分析
作者
Matthew S. Johnson,Daniel Schwab,Patrick Koval
摘要
Abstract Workplace safety policies are designed to ensure that employers internalize the costs of injuries, but employers can undermine these policies with threats of dismissal. We show that states’ adoption of the public policy exception to at-will employment—an exception forbidding employers from firing workers for filing workers’ compensation claims or for whistleblowing—led to a substantial reduction in injuries. The widespread adoption of the public policy exception explains 14% of the decline in fatal injury rates between 1979 and 1994. Statutory protections from retaliatory firing also improved safety, but only when employers faced sufficiently strong penalties for violating them.
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