激励
挤出效应
经济
竞赛(生物学)
货币经济学
货币政策
微观经济学
质量(理念)
用户生成的内容
公共经济学
计算机科学
社会化媒体
认识论
哲学
万维网
生物
生态学
出处
期刊:Information Systems Research
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2021-03-18
卷期号:32 (2): 394-409
被引量:121
标识
DOI:10.1287/isre.2020.0971
摘要
Many platforms use monetary incentives to encourage user-generated content (UGC) contributions. The empirical evidence, however, is contradictory: monetary incentives are shown to either increase or decrease contribution. We make the first attempt to build a unified theoretical model to understand the complex nature of the impact of monetary incentives. We consider contributors differentiated not only by their attitudes toward monetary incentives but also by their effectiveness to attract audience. We identify two scenarios where contributors can be crowded out when monetary incentives are present: (1) when a small amount of monetary incentive is introduced, the non–money-driven contributors reduce or even stop contributing (motivation crowding out); or (2) when the monetary incentive is relatively large, the high-effectiveness contributors crowd out the low-effectiveness ones (competition crowding out). As a result, an increase in the monetary incentive can either increase or decrease contributors’ participation and the total content volume contributed. Our results offer guidelines for different UGC platforms to design monetary incentive mechanisms.
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