期刊:Oxford University Press eBooks [Oxford University Press] 日期:2026-06-05卷期号:: 38-60
标识
DOI:10.1093/9780197840665.003.0004
摘要
Abstract Some philosophers working on aesthetics think that different kinds of pleasure cannot be differentiated from each other adequately. But philosophers have distinguished different minded capacities and states without any unjustified worries for centuries, for example, in distinguishing understanding from knowledge, action from belief, different emotions from each other, and even different values in light of different emotions, different kinds of love, and others. Aesthetic pleasure can be similarly distinguished from gratification and practical pleasure in terms of the capacities they belong to and their rational-affective profiles. While the profile of aesthetic pleasure (and displeasure)—that which we express when articulating our aesthetic engagements—is presented and defended throughout the book, this chapter introduces it—as a self-maintaining, self-contained, cognitive, holistically complex, universal, and rational feeling—and explains why this feeling that beauty merits is entitled to be called “pleasure,” and why even painful art merits this pleasure.