基于属性的加密
计算机科学
加密
可验证秘密共享
客户端加密
计算机安全
云计算
外包
访问控制
密文
动态加密
概率加密
40位加密
多重加密
计算机网络
公钥密码术
操作系统
程序设计语言
法学
集合(抽象数据类型)
政治学
标识
DOI:10.1109/tdsc.2017.2710119
摘要
Recently in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC) (doi: 10.1109/TDSC.2015.2499755), Ma et al. proposed a new construction of attribute-based encryption (ABE) which can outsource the complicated encryption task to Encryption Service Provider (ESP) in a verifiable manner. Despite the authors claimed that the results of the outsourced encryption can be checked by the user, we show that Ma et al.'s proposal fails to provide the verifiability property for outsourced encryption, the most essential security goal that a verifiable computation scheme should achieve. Specifically, by giving concrete attacks, we demonstrate that the ESP can return forged intermediate ciphertext to the user without being detected.
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