The impact of government subsidy on photovoltaic enterprises independent innovation based on the evolutionary game theory

Achieving a green, low-carbon economy necessitates clarifying the impacts of government photovoltaic (PV) subsidies on enterprise independent innovation in China. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among government, enterprises, and energy regulatory service centers (ERSC). It analyzes equilibriums' asymptotic stability and explores mechanisms affecting the system's evolution toward an ideal state. The results indicate that the strategic choices of the government, enterprises, and ERSC interplay with each other. Specifically, the primary influencing factors for enterprise innovation are costs, benefits, and penalties which promote innovation to an extent, while government subsidies have minimal effect. Under ERSC's policy guidance and services, enterprises controlling independent innovation costs given moderate punishment intensity enables system evolution toward sustainable innovation despite subsidy cancellation, achieving enterprises' ultimate carbon reduction goal in China. The originality in this study lies in the analysis of ERSC's influence on equilibrium, which models the impact of policies on enterprises, and ERSC plays an essential role in coordinating the government-enterprise information gap. Chinese government should strengthen regulatory system construction and increase financial support. This model can generate social benefits, reduce costs, and provide policymakers with an analytical framework and insights for policy formulation in China.