The impact of situational context and dispositions on costly signals of reassurance: Experimental evidence from Taiwan

Abstract When do costly signals of reassurance enhance trust between nations? While previous research has established the role of dispositions in costly signaling, this paper highlights the critical influence of situational context. Employing an interactionist framework, we theorize that the effectiveness of costly signals depends on the complex interplay between situational contexts, such as crises and non‐crises, and individual dispositions, particularly hawkish and dovish orientations. We test our theory through two identical survey experiments fielded among Taiwanese citizens—one conducted during a crisis and the other during a non‐crisis period. Our findings show that during crises, China's costly reassurances are ineffective and even backfire among hawkish individuals. In contrast, China's costly reassuring signals enhance trust in non‐crisis situations, particularly among dovish individuals. Our findings contribute to signaling theory by underscoring important boundary conditions and the value of integrating contextual and psychological factors in analyzing the efficacy of costly signals. Moreover, by demonstrating that backfire effects emerge when hawks encounter reassurance during crises, we provide preliminary evidence on the scope conditions of this phenomenon. These insights offer empirical implications for policymakers, emphasizing the need for tailored reassurance strategies that account for timing and audience to effectively build trust between nations.