Consumer Preference Information Sharing of Online Platforms with Competing Suppliers and Customization

业务 个性化 偏爱 产品(数学) 激励 信息共享 营销 质量(理念) 共享经济 经济盈余 信息过载 信息不对称 上游(联网) 信息技术 市场份额 下游(制造业) 产业组织 消费者福利 互联网
作者
Yong Zha,Quan Li,Tingliang Huang,Liang Liang
出处
期刊:Manufacturing & Service Operations Management [Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1287/msom.2025.0168
摘要

Problem definition: Online platforms have access to massive data about consumer preferences, whereas upstream suppliers typically do not. This study explores how an online platform should strategically share its privately owned consumer preference information with suppliers to help them determine optimal prices under the marketplace or reselling model. Enabled by advanced technological developments such as flexible manufacturing, 3D printing, and AI, suppliers may have the capability to offer customized or personalized products based on shared consumer preference information. We next examine the implications of the customization policies for suppliers if preference information is shared. Methodology/results: Using a game-theoretic framework, we find that the platform may share information with one supplier only under the marketplace model but never does under the reselling model. When the preference uncertainty is low, the platform may not share information with either supplier under the marketplace model but may share with both because of weakened double marginalization under the reselling model. The platform adopts the marketplace model when the product quality is low but switches to reselling when the product quality is high. Managerial implications: Interestingly, the customization capability for suppliers may weaken the platform’s incentive to share information under the marketplace model, whereas it may strengthen it under the reselling model. Whereas the option of customization may benefit consumers and society under the marketplace model, it never increases consumer surplus and social welfare under the reselling model. Our findings provide useful managerial guidelines for an online platform on when and with whom to share customer preference information and for policy makers on how to design information or data-sharing policies to benefit society, especially with the new advanced technological developments. Funding: This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72188101, 72531010, 72672174, 72301260 and 72371235] and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Project ID: WK2040250142). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2025.0168 .
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