Post‐CEO retirement appointments and financial accounting—Evidence from CEO turnovers

Abstract Prior research has shown that when boards seek to appoint CEOs as outside directors, the director labor market rewards CEOs' accounting performance. This study examines whether the external labor market's assessment of the accounting performance is moderated by CEOs' past exercise of financial reporting discretion in the form of accruals and real earnings management and financial statement readability. Our results show a positive association between post‐CEO board opportunities and within‐GAAP accruals management as well as to more readable financial statements. Earnings restatements are associated with fewer board positions and director pay. However, the director labor market appears to punish R&D expenditure above the industry median, suggesting that boards view overinvestment as a risky avenue for growth. Finally, the results suggest that for CEOs with planned retirement, the director labor market provides some mitigating effect on the horizon problem.