On multiple agencies: when do things matter?

The late twentieth century sociology began to recognise the performative role of technological artefacts in human lives. These objects enact their non-human agency by actions that human users cannot completely control. This paper critically assesses existing approaches that investigate the relation of human and non-human agencies (actor-network theory, the ventriloqual perspective on communication, contemporary affordance theory). The main focus of this article is the challenge of describing the performative influence of routine and invisible objects. By analysing existing approaches that employ the concepts of inscriptions and attachments, the paper argues that the ventriloqual perspective on communication is human-centered because it assesses the relevance of an object by pointing to a person’s attitude to it (attachment). In turn, actor-network theory is object-centered as it emphasizes the visible performativity of technologies (inscriptions) and ignores the action possibilities provided by them. Meanwhile, contemporary affordance theory helps to extend the agency of things to their potential performances. Despite the shortcomings and merits of existing approaches, each of these frameworks employ multiple types of agencies without full acknowledgement. Using the examples of several empirical studies, the author shows that there is a lack of conceptual clarity when trying to account for the agency of routine and invisible objects. By reconciling the inscription and affordance perspectives, the author delineates four types of agencies that material objects can enact. In the conclusion, theoretical and methodological implications for future research are discussed.