PRICING AND SERVICE STRATEGIES OF DUAL-CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAIN UNDER INFORMATION SHARING

With the rapid popularization of online shopping, more and more enterprises adopt dual-channel supply chain structures, and information sharing plays an important role in the implementation of dual-channel supply chain management. Most of the existing literature has investigated one-way information sharing from the retailer to the manufacturer, whereas few studies on two-way information sharing between the manufacturer and retailer in a dual-channel supply chain have been explored. A dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, both of whom have private information about consumer preference and service cost was considered in this study. Game-theoretic models were developed to investigate the decision-making problem of dual-channel members in two information-sharing scenarios including non-information sharing and information sharing respectively. Furthermore, the impact of the manufacturer's information forecast capability on the sale price, service level, and profits were analyzed through numerical example. Results show that information sharing can increase the wholesale price, sale price, and online service level; furthermore, information sharing not always be beneficial for dual-channel supply chain members. When the information forecast capability of the manufacturer is relatively weak, information sharing can increase supply chain members' profits. On the contrary, information sharing may not always increase his profits. Additionally, the retailer cannot benefit from information sharing in any cases, which accounts for his weak willingness to share information with the manufacturer. This study provides a significant reference for decision-making. Keywords: dual-channel supply chain; information sharing; price decisions; service decisions