投资(军事)
公司
期限(时间)
竞赛(生物学)
构造(python库)
代理(哲学)
业务
中国
持续性
经济
财务
政治
量子力学
生物
计算机科学
认识论
物理
哲学
程序设计语言
法学
生态学
政治学
作者
Qilong Cao,Ju Meng,Jinglei Li,Changbao Zhong
出处
期刊:Sustainability
[Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute]
日期:2022-12-30
卷期号:15 (1): 708-708
被引量:41
摘要
A corporation’s ability to uphold valuable long-term investments is a critical component of the business’s sustainability. Combining the views of the upper echelons theory and agency theory, this study argues that myopic managerial behavior is detrimental to a firm’s long-term investment. We construct an indicator assessing managerial myopia based on the textual analysis approach. The moderating effect analysis suggested that the negative impact of managerial myopia on long-term investments is lessened with an increase in institutional investor ownership and analyst coverage. In addition, we found that managerial myopia negatively correlates with capital expenditures and R&D investments. Furthermore, the cross-sectional analysis suggested that the correlation between managerial myopia and long-term investment is stronger among firms with higher industry competition, poor performance levels, and in non-state-owned enterprises.
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