The behavior of consumer buying new energy vehicles based on stochastic evolutionary game

China?s current vehicle emissions caused by air pollution problems have become increasingly prominent. How to improve new energy vehicle market share, and effectively guide the consumer buying behavior become a problem, which the government and social have to be solved. In this paper, according to establish the stochastic evolutionary game model between the government and consumers in the car market, introducing of random factors analysis on the impact of evolutionary stability ,will obtain the stable strategy of government and automotive consumers. And on the basis of it, we study the government support, cost of vehicles, the use of cost, the utility of automobile use for the ways of evolutionary stability, with case further illustrates the external disturbance factors on consumer purchase of new energy vehicles in evolutionary game process stability. Studies show that: the increasing government subsidy policy, the reducing life cycle costs of new energy vehicles and the improving effectiveness of new energy vehicles will lead the model?s evolution to the orientation of consumer purchasing new energy vehicles.