执行
惩罚(心理学)
政治
极限(数学)
执法
领域(数学)
边际成本
业务
经济
计算机安全
公共经济学
法律与经济学
环境经济学
计算机科学
微观经济学
法学
政治学
数学
心理学
社会心理学
数学分析
纯数学
作者
Oliver Browne,Ludovica Gazzè,Michael Greenstone,Olga Rostapshova
摘要
Abstract New technologies allow perfect detection of environmental violations at near-zero marginal cost, but take-up is low. We conducted a field experiment to evaluate enforcement of water conservation rules with smart meters in Fresno, CA. Households were randomly assigned combinations of enforcement method (automated or in-person inspections) and fines. Automated enforcement increased households’ punishment rates from 0.1% to 14%, decreased summer water use by 3%, and reduced violations by 17%, while higher fine levels had little effect. However, automated enforcement also increased customer complaints by 1,102%, ultimately causing its cancellation and highlighting that political considerations limit technological solutions to enforcement challenges.
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