放牧
共同基金
羊群行为
业务
信息不对称
库存(枪支)
中国
货币经济学
财务
经济
地理
林业
机械工程
工程类
政治学
法学
作者
Lixuan Feng,Cheng Xiang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2022.103517
摘要
Using short-selling pilot programs in China as quasi-natural experiments, we investigate how short-selling impacts mutual fund herding. We find that mutual funds herd more on firms eligible for short-selling than those not. The effect is larger for firms with fewer media coverage, higher financial reporting opacity, or lower audit quality. Channel tests show that short-selling decreases information asymmetry proxied by informed trading and stock illiquidity. Additionally, short-selling strengthens the price impact of herding without causing reversals. Our findings fit the correlated signal theory: mutual funds receive more similar information on firms eligible for short-selling and, thus, herd more on them.
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