特许经销权
价值(数学)
文件夹
业务
激励
衡平法
财务
精算学
经济
营销
微观经济学
机器学习
计算机科学
政治学
法学
作者
Rebecca S. Demsetz,Marc R. Saidenberg,Philip E. Strahan
出处
期刊:Social Science Research Network
[Social Science Electronic Publishing]
日期:1996-01-01
被引量:347
摘要
As protectors of the safety and soundness of the banking system, banking supervisors are responsible for keeping banks' risk taking in check. The authors explain that franchise value - the present value of the stream of profits that a firm is expected to earn as a going concern - makes the supervisor's job easier by reducing banks' incentives to take risks. The authors explore the relationship between franchise value and risk taking from 1986 to 1994 using both balance-sheet data and stock returns. They find that banks with high franchise value operate more safely than those with low franchise value. In particular, high-franchise-value banks hold more capital and take on less portfolio risk, primarily by diversifying their lending activities.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI