特许经销权
价值(数学)
文件夹
业务
激励
衡平法
财务
精算学
经济
营销
微观经济学
政治学
计算机科学
机器学习
法学
作者
Rebecca S. Demsetz,Marc R. Saidenberg,Philip E. Strahan
摘要
As protectors of the safety and soundness of the banking system, banking supervisors are responsible for keeping banks' risk taking in check. The authors explain that franchise value - the present value of the stream of profits that a firm is expected to earn as a going concern - makes the supervisor's job easier by reducing banks' incentives to take risks. The authors explore the relationship between franchise value and risk taking from 1986 to 1994 using both balance-sheet data and stock returns. They find that banks with high franchise value operate more safely than those with low franchise value. In particular, high-franchise-value banks hold more capital and take on less portfolio risk, primarily by diversifying their lending activities.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI