业务
供应链
产业组织
投资(军事)
投资策略
供应链管理
供应链风险管理
供应商关系管理
财务
战略管理
战略式采购
技术战略
微观经济学
链条(单位)
运营管理
商业
作者
An'na Wang,Yujie Xiao,Wenyan Zhuo,Xiaofeng Yu
标识
DOI:10.1080/1540496x.2026.2745681
摘要
This paper studies strategic supply chain interactions when a retailer invests in reducing an incumbent supplier’s production cost and may introduce a competing supplier. Analyzing scenarios with and without investment spillovers yields three insights: (1) supplier entry can boost retailer investment; (2) contrary to conventional wisdom, when production cost and competitive pressure are high, an entrant supplier can uniquely benefit the incumbent supplier; (3) a novel revenue and cost-sharing contract can serve as a strategic tool for the incumbent supplier to deter entry. Numerical analysis confirms the robustness of these results under partial spillovers.
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