中国
国家安全
危害
代表(政治)
制度化
政治学
政治经济学
公共行政
经济
政治
法学
标识
DOI:10.1080/10163270709464142
摘要
The economic rise of China has continuously generated the “rise of the China threat” debate among scholars. Yet there is limited understanding on how national security policies are devised in China, increasing the uneasiness about China's strategic behavior. This paper attempts to shed new light on China's strategic behavior by analyzing the general logic of policymaking within China's top leadership group— the CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). Utilizing the concept of “specialized representation,” this paper analyzes the composition of representatives within the PBSC as an important indicator of policy priority and interest representation of key sectors and groups within the policymaking process. The continuously waning PLA representation in the PBSC since the 1990s is a strong indicator of the PLA's weakening influence in national security policymaking. The findings of this paper suggest that the logic dominating China's security policymaking is not as different from other “normal” nations as one might think. With the increased institutionalization of the policymaking process in general and waning representation of the PLA in the security policymaking in particular, China's strategic choices are more likely to be influenced by civilian leaders, who need to consider the interests of their domestic constituents rather than those of the military. Unless it faces a significant challenge to its national security, China is unlikely to make a radical strategic move that could threaten international stability and thus harm its economic interests.
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