企业社会责任
业务
贷款
样品(材料)
债务
社会责任
质量(理念)
基点
利用
金融体系
会计
财务
货币经济学
经济
利率
生态学
哲学
化学
计算机安全
色谱法
认识论
计算机科学
生物
作者
Allen Goss,Gordon S. Roberts
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.12.002
摘要
This study examines the link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and bank debt. Our focus on banks exploits their specialized role as delegated monitors of the firm. Using a sample of 3996 loans to US firms, we find that firms with social responsibility concerns pay between 7 and 18 basis points more than firms that are more responsible. Lenders are more sensitive to CSR concerns in the absence of security. We document a mixed reaction to discretionary CSR investments. Low-quality borrowers that engage in discretionary CSR spending face higher loan spreads and shorter maturities, but lenders are indifferent to CSR investments by high-quality borrowers.
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