补贴
再制造
业务
供应链
竞赛(生物学)
产业组织
激励
政府(语言学)
对偶(语法数字)
营销
微观经济学
经济
市场经济
艺术
生态学
语言学
哲学
文学类
生物
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139673
摘要
Many governments in different countries and regions incentivize enterprises to recycle and remanufacture through subsidies to improve resource recovery efficiency. This article establishes a supply chain consisting of retailer R, manufacturer M, and third-party supplier N based on government regulations. Firstly, This paper discussed whether retailer R should establish its brand. Secondly, whether manufacturer M chooses internal recycling and whether to cooperate with competitive or non-competitive suppliers was discussed. Finally, the issue of incentive consistency was discussed from the government's perspective. This paper has established four typical scenarios: basic Scenario, cooperative competition, complete competition scenario, and tripartite Scenario. Our research results indicate that Recycling subsidies and remanufacturing subsidies have a promoting effect on retailer R's establishment of independent brands and manufacturer M's participation in internal recycling, with recycling subsidies having a more significant promoting effect on manufacturer M's participation in internal recycling. The government should control the recycling subsidy not to be too high to ensure that both manufacturer M and retailer R prefer the CO scenario and enhance the stability of the supply chain. At the same time, remanufacturing subsidies should be appropriately increased to increase social welfare.
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