抵押品
贷款
业务
债务
货币经济学
资产(计算机安全)
休克(循环)
资信证明
金融体系
信用记录
分期付款信用证
财务
信用增级
信用风险
经济
医学
计算机安全
计算机科学
内科学
出处
期刊:European Finance Review
[Oxford University Press]
日期:2021-05-11
卷期号:26 (2): 287-317
被引量:37
摘要
Abstract Using a comprehensive dataset collected by the Federal Reserve, I find that over one-third of corporate loans issued by US banks are fully guaranteed by legal entities separate from borrowing firms. Using an empirical strategy that accounts for time-varying firm and lender effects, I find that the existence of a third-party credit guarantee is negatively related to loan risk, loan rate, and loan delinquency. Third-party credit guarantees alleviate the effect of collateral constraints in credit market. Firms (particularly smaller firms) that experience a negative shock to their asset values are less likely to use collateral and more likely to use credit guarantees in new borrowings.
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