标准化
衡平法
透视图(图形)
业务
结果(博弈论)
投资(军事)
产业组织
营销
经济
微观经济学
计算机科学
人工智能
政治
政治学
法学
操作系统
作者
Alfred G. Warner,James F. Fairbank,H. Kevin Steensma
标识
DOI:10.1177/0149206305280108
摘要
Scholars have theorized that firms can intervene in the creation of formal technology standards to reduce uncertainty and influence the outcome to their advantage. One approach is through early acquisition: Firms can acquire targets with relevant technology prior to standardization. Using real options logic, the authors show how early acquisitions can be considered a growth option under certain circumstances. They find that acquisitions are more likely to occur before the passage of the standard when (a) acquirers lacked relevant technical knowledge, (b) target firms possessed relevant technical knowledge,and (c) acquirers had a prior equity investment in the target firm.
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