语调(文学)
业务
责任保险
责任
精算学
风险管理
会计
财务
文学类
艺术
作者
Yi Ru,Wei Zhao,Zihao Su
标识
DOI:10.1080/16081625.2023.2225536
摘要
We examine whether directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) influences managers' strategic tone manipulation of management discussion and analysis. We find that D&O insurance is positively associated with upward tone manipulation. This association is more pronounced for firms with greater litigation risk or highly-motivated and overconfident managers. Additionally, we document more favorable short-term returns and intensive reversals responding to positive tones issued by D&O insurance-covered firms. Besides, D&O insurance-shielded managers may inflate the tone by reducing risk-factor information disclosures. Overall, our results support that D&O insurance can trigger managers' unethical manipulations by reducing their expected personal legal liability.
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