语调(文学)                        
                
                                
                        
                            业务                        
                
                                
                        
                            责任保险                        
                
                                
                        
                            责任                        
                
                                
                        
                            精算学                        
                
                                
                        
                            风险管理                        
                
                                
                        
                            会计                        
                
                                
                        
                            财务                        
                
                                
                        
                            文学类                        
                
                                
                        
                            艺术                        
                
                        
                    
            作者
            
                Yi Ru,Wei Zhao,Zihao Su            
         
                    
        
    
            
            标识
            
                                    DOI:10.1080/16081625.2023.2225536
                                    
                                
                                 
         
        
                
            摘要
            
            We examine whether directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) influences managers' strategic tone manipulation of management discussion and analysis. We find that D&O insurance is positively associated with upward tone manipulation. This association is more pronounced for firms with greater litigation risk or highly-motivated and overconfident managers. Additionally, we document more favorable short-term returns and intensive reversals responding to positive tones issued by D&O insurance-covered firms. Besides, D&O insurance-shielded managers may inflate the tone by reducing risk-factor information disclosures. Overall, our results support that D&O insurance can trigger managers' unethical manipulations by reducing their expected personal legal liability.
         
            
 
                 
                
                    
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