激励
格兰杰因果关系
灵活性(工程)
中国
面板数据
政府(语言学)
环境扫描
产业组织
业务
可持续发展
环境法规
控制(管理)
自然资源经济学
指挥与控制
订单(交换)
波特假说
经济
环境管理体系
市场经济
财务
工程类
生态学
语言学
政治学
生物
管理
计量经济学
航空航天工程
法学
哲学
灌溉
作者
Lijun Liu,Jiayu Jiang,Jiacong Bian,Yazhou Liu,Guanghua Lin,Yingkai Yin
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.127007
摘要
To achieve sustainable economic development, many developing countries have continuously tightened their environmental regulations; for example, the Chinese government revised some policies to protect the environment, such as the Environmental Protection Law, and levied environmental taxes. Will these regulatory tools affect the growth of the industrial economy? What are the differences in the influence of various types of environmental regulations? Based on city-level panel data from China, this paper applied a difference-in-difference (DID) model and a bootstrap panel Granger causality test to investigate the relationship between two types of environmental regulations (command-and-control environmental regulation and market-Based incentive environmental regulation) and industrial growth. The results show that (1) Command-and-control environmental regulation (CAC) has a significant inhibitory effect on industrial growth. (2) In most regions, there is no significant Granger causality between market-based incentive environmental regulation (MBI) and industrial growth. (3) Compared with command-and-control environmental regulation, market-based incentive environmental regulation allows more flexibility for enterprises, which is more beneficial for technological innovation. Meanwhile, market-based incentive environmental regulation does little to suppress industrial growth.
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