Reputation and payoff integration through interaction diversity enhances cooperation in spatial public goods games

Abstract Reputation and payoff information play an important role in human interactions. Many studies have considered combining reputation and payoff as a strategy updating rule in the spatial public goods game (SPGG) model. However, their social interaction scope is homogeneous. In fact, in the real world, individuals often differ in personal characteristics, such as different religious beliefs, different economic status, and different social tendencies. Based on this phenomenon, the mechanism of interaction diversity is introduced into the improved SPGG model. Specifically, the number of neighbors who influence each participant in the group varies. They can randomly select interaction partners from their current neighbors in the von Neumann neighborhood. This enhanced mechanism is grounded in an inhomogeneous interaction domain, with the objective of examining the impact of these modifications on the evolution of cooperation. The results demonstrated that incorporating a combination of reputation and payoff as the strategy update rule, coupled with the introduction of interaction diversity during neighbor interactions, could markedly enhance both the level and stability of cooperation.