Study on the Evolutionary Game of Cooperation and Innovation in Science and Technology Town Enterprises

Developing science- and innovation-based special towns plays a pivotal role in new urbanization, and enterprise cooperative innovation can help accelerate the development of high-quality science- and innovation-based special towns. A dynamic evolutionary model of enterprise cooperative innovation under two different mechanisms of market law and government regulation is developed for a government-led science and innovation town. The influence of various influencing factors, including willingness to cooperate, on the choice of enterprise cooperative innovation strategy is examined, and MATLAB simulation is used to verify the analysis and provide suggestions for promoting the sustainability of enterprise cooperative innovation. As a result of the study, it is shown that factors influencing the choice of cooperative innovation strategy for enterprises under the market mechanism include the cost and benefits of cooperative innovation, the degree of willingness to cooperate, and the degree of effort. When the market mechanism fails, government subsidies and incentive bonuses are more effective than either alone when it comes to encouraging firms to adopt cooperative innovation strategies. When government penalties are lower than free-rider benefits, they cannot influence firms’ speculative behavior. It is found that only a penalty intensity above the threshold can effectively inhibit the phenomenon of free-riding and motivate enterprises in science- and innovation-oriented characteristic towns to choose a cooperative innovation strategy, and the greater the penalty intensity, the faster the enterprises will tend to cooperate and innovate.