Government subsidy design: knowledge transfer in R&D networks considering risk attitudes and reputation effects

The design of government subsidies is essential in supporting collaborative innovation and promoting sustainable development in R&D networks. This study explores the influence of different government subsidy strategies designed for R&D networks on inter-enterprise knowledge transfer. Drawing upon evolutionary game theory, it examines how impact is contingent upon enterprises' risk attitudes and reputation effects. The results indicate that when enterprises exhibit homogeneous risk attitudes, government subsidy policies encouraging risk-seeking behaviors can effectively enhance the knowledge-transferring level. When enterprises possess heterogeneous risk attitudes, a greater diversity of risk attitudes leads to a more conducive environment for knowledge transfer. Incorporating a rigorous reputation tolerance into the design of government subsidies in R&D networks can effectively elevate knowledge transfer. Therefore, policymakers can design tailored government subsidies and incentive mechanisms grounded in enterprises' risk attitudes and reputation effects. This study provides theoretical and policy implications for designing government subsidies and collaboration in R&D networks.