Adoption of blockchain considering platform’s information sharing and service effort under the cap-and-trade scheme

We consider a manufacturer and an e-platform where the manufacturer sells products through offline and e-platform channels under the cap-and-trade scheme. The interaction between the two channels produces the cross-channel effect (CCE). This manufacturer cooperates with the e-platform in the agency or reseller mode. In addition, the platform shares its observed data with the manufacturer and the blockchain can achieve traceability and high transparency of these data. We formulate a Stackelberg game to derive the following results: In the agency mode, the optimal service level is independent of (decreases with) CCE without (with) blockchain. CCE positively affects the optimal service level in the reseller mode and the optimal service level has no impact on (increases with) the cap in the agency (reseller) mode. Second, when the platform-enabled power is high (low), the platform is (not) willing to adopt blockchain. Third, coordination of the manufacturer and platform only can be achieved in the agency mode when CCE is low with blockchain. The reseller mode can (cannot) achieve coordination of the two firms with (without) blockchain. We also consider the cases where the manufacturer serves as the leader and the omni-channel strategy is adopted to check the robustness of the coordination results.