5 The meaning(s) of solidarity

In this chapter, Rainer Forst raises two concerns about the account of solidarity given by Andrea Sangiovanni. Firstly, he notes that Sangiovanni only employs ‘solidarity’ in the singular, to denote the core content of any meaningful usage of the term, while conceptions provide thicker interpretations of the central components. But it is not clear why Sangiovanni calls the result of different interpretations different ‘concepts of solidarity’ and not ‘conceptions’ of solidarity, as Forst would prefer to do. Secondly, Forst addresses one of the core elements of solidarity, that of ‘joint action.’ Why is ‘action’, as an actual event, required for solidarity? Sangiovanni’s analysis makes clear that different kinds of justifications provide different ‘reason[s] to act in solidarity’ with others. So solidarity implies an identification-based reason to act in solidarity and the willingness to do so if necessary. But that practical attitude and willingness seems to be sufficient to be solidary, and the actual acting not required, as it depends on contingent circumstances. Contrary to what Sangiovanni says, to be in solidarity is to possess a particular practical state of mind. To actually act need not be part of the definition of what solidarity is.