期刊:Oxford University Press eBooks [Oxford University Press] 日期:2014-12-12卷期号:: 110-134被引量:49
标识
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199967421.003.0006
摘要
Abstract An important topic in virtue ethics is the idea that virtue is something learned and developed in a sustained and continuing way from early childhood through to the rest of one's life. Yet this insight is the source of two persistent problems that threaten to undermine virtue ethics as a moral theory. In this chapter solutions to both problems are proposed from within the framework of virtue ethics. The first is the "self-centeredness" objection to virtue ethics that keeps reappearing in more sophisticated forms. The second is Robert Johnson's claim that conceptions of right action for virtue ethics cannot account for the right actions of self-improving agents who are not yet fully virtuous. The solution to both problems involves recognizing a virtue whose field is self-improvement. This virtue has a target (self-improvement) and multiple criteria to meet multiple criteria.