摘要
I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and the republic for which it stands ... (1) Article I is the first article of the Constitution because it was to be the foundation of our republic. Republic means the people's government rather than that of a king or an oligarchy. (2) To make the federal government a republic, Article I assigns the power to decide the overarching issues of policy to a legislature whose members are supposed to be accountable to the people. (3) The members of this legislature, Congress, would therefore bear personal responsibility to the people for the consequences of these pivotal decisions. This responsibility would tend to link the actions of the federal government to the interests of the people. As I will argue, this linkage remained strong for over a century and a half--indeed grew stronger as the electorate came to include a larger portion of the population--until a half century ago when, members of Congress and Presidents of both parties began to evade Article I's foundational purpose. They devised and used new ways of drafting legislation that let them take the credit for promises of good news while avoiding the blame when government produces bad results. With five key tricks, elected officials now avoid accounting to us for many unpopular consequences. Part I of my analysis argues that Article I's purpose of making politically accountable officials personally responsible for consequences is vital to the success and endurance of the republic. Part II shows how elected officials began to evade such personal responsibility a half century ago. Part III explains how this evasion of personal responsibility has led to bumptious promises, failed policies, and spiraling distrust of government as well as polarization, gridlock, and the increased influence of special interests. The ensuing distrust set the stage for outsider candidates such as Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. Whatever the fate of the Trump presidency, the distrust is likely to build so long as the tricks continue. Part IV proposes a statute, the Honest Deal Act, which would change the ground rules of legislative politics to force elected officials to once again shoulder personal responsibility for consequences. We cannot stop the tricks by broadening the powers of the President, constitutional adjudication, or constitutional amendments. Part V argues that it is possible, surprising as it might seem, to get elected officials to enact a statute that forces them to shoulder responsibility. I. ARTICLE I'S PURPOSE OF IMPOSING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IS CRITICAL The people who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 to draft a constitution for the United States were not all-knowing, but they did respond sensibly to the challenge of finding a way that a population with clashing interests could get along. They put at the heart of the country's new government a legislative process in which a House of Representatives and a Senate whose members would both represent different constituencies and made them personally responsible for the consequences of their legislative decisions by requiring them to publish the Yeas and Nays on controversial matters. (4) The Constitution assigned to this legislative process the most pivotal decisions, such as decisions to spend the people's money, take the people's money through taxes, or incur debt. (5) Those assignments put these legislators, including the President when acting under Article I, (6) in the middle of such conflicts as those between constituents who want more money from the government, constituents who do not want to pay more taxes to the government, and constituents who oppose debt because they fear that it will require cutting spending cuts or increasing taxes in the future. The legislators would thus be personally responsible for both the popular and unpopular consequences of their decisions. That, in turn would tend to generate open debate. …