Extension of signal-to-noise ratio measurement method to byte-by-byte side-channel attack
作者
Kengo Iokibe,Toshiaki Teshima,Yusuke Yano,Yoshitaka Toyota
标识
DOI:10.1109/isemc.2018.8393880
摘要
Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of side-channel traces leaked from cryptographic ICs can be a candidate of system-designer-friendly design index in security evaluation against the side-channel attack (SCA). A method to calculate SNR of side-channel traces from measured side-channel traces was proposed for the scenario of the byte-by-byte attack on AES cryptographic circuits. The proposed method was a simple extension of an SNR calculation method for the brute force attack scenario proposed in a previous study. Measured SNRs according to the methods were validated by comparison with analytical formulas. Results suggested that the proposed method could provide SNRs of side-channel traces accurately.