Government strategy for banning gasoline vehicles: Evidence from tripartite evolutionary game

To cope with severe environmental pollution and energy shortages, China proposed that it would ban the sale of gasoline vehicles (GVs) in the future. Considering the rent-seeking ( R – S ) behavior of vehicle enterprises and the game relationship between the central government and local governments when implementing a policy of Banning Gasoline Vehicle Sales Policy (BGVSP), we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model with vehicle enterprises, local governments, and the central government. The influence of financial support and punishment by government departments on the evolution of the policy was explored using a numerical simulation. The main results are as follows. (1) Local governments can strengthen the construction of clean government and increase the cost of R – S when vehicle enterprises violate the policy to ensure that BGVSP can be effectively implemented. (2) The central government should increase capital investment, improve the transfer payment, reward to local governments and vehicle enterprises, to accelerate the realization of GVs withdrawing from the market. (3) Local governments should increase the penalties for vehicle enterprises' illegal behaviors to accelerate the implementation of BGVSP. Our study can not only advance the research on industry policy of new energy vehicles, but also provide a significant reference for policy makers. • Establish a tripartite evolutionary game model among vehicle enterprises, local government and central government. • Discuss the strategy selection of stakeholders in the process of banning gasoline vehicles. • Analyze the effects of the government's financial support and punishment measures by simulation. • Strengthen local governments' efforts to build clean governments to support the ban on gasoline vehicles.