This paper contributes to an ongoing policy debate over government-mandated benefits [6; 9; 10; 13; 17; 22; 24; 27]. Current government mandates or statuatory employee include social security, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, maternity leave, etc. However, policy initiatives at every level of government routinely recommend new mandates. Among today's proposals, targeted employers would be required to offer new benefits from childcare to health care. Debates over proposals for new government mandates usually center on two related questions: i) do the advantages outweigh the costs?, and ii) what are the alternatives? Assuming government intervention can be justified [17], those in favor of employer mandates contend compulsory benefits packages are less disruptive than a government tax/transfer program that offers the same benefits [22]. If employer-provided benefit mandates are fully valued by employees, wages fall to offset the cost of benefits, and there will be no efficiency cost. Alternatively, when government-provided benefits are financed with a tax, there is a deadweight loss. A generally conceded drawback of employer mandates is that they often ignore part-time workers and the unemployed [5]. However, critics of employer mandates go further, emphasizing that higher mandated labor costs creates unemployment [11], and/or induces firms to rely more heavily on part-time workers [15; 21]. If instead of shedding labor or turning to part-time workers, targeted employers reduce wages (or wage growth) to offset the costs of new mandates,1 then employee valuation becomes the central issue. For example, employees who prefer cash to the new benefits might keep their jobs, but their well-being declines. This paper offers a straightforward extension of the traditional utility