精英
绅士
地方治理
激励
公司治理
政治学
代理(统计)
国家(计算机科学)
中国
候选资格
政治经济学
公共行政
地方政府
法学
政治
经济
市场经济
财务
机器学习
计算机科学
算法
作者
Yu Hao,Zhengcheng Liu,Xi Wang,Lian Zhou
标识
DOI:10.1017/s0022050722000225
摘要
This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the civil service exam on local governance in early twentieth-century China. Before the abolition, local elites collected surtaxes that financed local public goods, but they were supervised by the state and could lose candidacy for higher status if they engaged in corrupt behavior. This prospect of upward mobility (POUM) gave them incentives to behave well, which the abolition of the exam removed. Using anti-elite protests as a proxy for the deterioration of local governance, we find that prefectures with a higher POUM experienced more incidents of anti-elite protests after the abolition.
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